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Abstract 
 
With European Monetary Union (EMU), there was an increase in the adjusted 
spreads of euro-area sovereign securities over Germany (corrected from the 
foreign exchange risk), causing a lower than expected fall in borrowing costs. The 
objective of this paper is to study the reasons for this increase, and in particular, 
whether the change in the price assigned by markets was due to domestic factors 
(credit risk and/or market liquidity) or to international risk factors. The empirical 
evidence suggests that it may have been a change in the market assessment of 
domestic (both liquidity and default risk) rather than international factors that  
caused the observed increase in adjusted spreads with Monetary Integration, even 
though, since market size scale economies have increased since EMU, their effect 
differs according to the size of the market.  
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1. Introduction. 
European Monetary Union (EMU) caused large-scale changes in euro-area sovereign securities markets (see Danthine et 
al. 2001, and the BIS Study group on fixed income markets, 2001). Before the introduction of the euro, yield 
differentials between European sovereign borrowers were mostly determined by four factors: expectations of exchange 
rate fluctuations, differences in domestic tax-regimes, differences in credit risk, and differences in market liquidity. The 
removal of foreign exchange risk in January 1999 and the elimination (or reduction to insignificant levels) of differences 
in tax treatment during the 1990s eliminated two of these factors, and paved the way for a much more integrated and 
competitive public debt market. 
As a result, euro-area government bond markets began to be considered as a single market, comparable in terms of size 
to the US or Japanese markets. Nevertheless, segmentation did not disappear completely. In 2006, public debt 
management is still decentralised under the responsibility of 12 sovereign issuers with differences in rating and a variety 
of issuing techniques (see Favero, Missale and Piga, 1999). These are features that distinguish the euro-area debt market 
from its US and Japanese counterparts. One example of this segmentation is the persistence of yield differentials. 
This paper sets out to examine this persistence and to explore what happened to euro-area countries’ yield spreads on 
government bonds after the introduction of the euro. The pre-EMU literature speculated that with the elimination of 
currency risk, yield spreads would narrow and would primarily reflect default risk. Conversely, market participants and 
member state debt managers appeared to believe that EMU yield differentials would be due mostly to liquidity factors. 
Therefore, in order to reduce borrowing costs, debt managers introduced substantial innovations that were expected to 
enhance the liquidity of their bonds.      
Actually, the main effects of the introduction of the euro in government bond markets were, on the one hand, an 
increase in the degree of substitutability among securities issued by different treasuries and higher levels of competition 
between issuers to attract investors, which led to a certain reorganisation of the market structure1, and on the other, a 
                                                 
1 Blanco (2001) reports that on the side of the issuers, some significant changes were observed such as the harmonisation of market conventions in the 
computation of yields, the introduction of a single trading calendar and pre-announced auction calendars, or the increase in issue sizes. In some 
countries, the creation of large issues was facilitated by the introduction of programmes of exchange of old illiquid bonds for new bonds and by the 
concentration of issuance activity in a smaller number of benchmark securities. With the aim of attracting more investors, some of the smaller 
issuers such as Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal resorted to syndication procedures. Others such as the French Treasury  introduced 
new instruments such as constant maturity and inflation-indexed bonds.  
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gain in the importance of credit risk and market liquidity in yield differentials. Before Monetary Union differences in 
these factors were perhaps not completely priced due to market segmentation.   
Therefore, a first point that will be assessed in this paper is whether EMU has increased credit risk by denying 
governments the emergency exit of money creation and by forbidding both the ECB and the EU to bail out troubled 
governments; or whether, conversely, the maximum threshold that countries have for both their budget deficit and their 
level of public indebtedness (resulting in broad improvements in budgetary balances) and the possibility that markets do 
not regard the “no-bail-out” clause as credible, especially in the case of large markets (i.e. that the theory “too big to fail” 
holds), have actually resulted in a decrease in perceived credit risk.  
Secondly, the introduction of the euro reduced segmentation among euro-area government bond markets. The removal 
of the exchange rate risk brought down an important barrier that had fostered captive domestic markets and had gone 
some way to explaining the home bias that existed in cross-border investments in the European Union. Adjaouté et al. 
(2000) traced the extent of the home bias, in both the bond and equities markets, for the major European countries -- 
the UK, France, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, and Italy -- during the period 1980-19992. The increased 
substitutability of sovereign securities after EMU intensified the rivalry between sovereign issuers to attract investors, 
since they were competing directly for the same pool of funding. In this new scenario, market liquidity differences may 
have become a more significant component of yield spreads. This is the second point that will be assessed in this study.  
Nevertheless, as the literature on this topic is limited, the analysis will also build on findings in the empirical literature 
regarding sovereign bond yield spreads on emerging markets, which have suggested that spreads are also sensitive to 
international risk factors, mainly US risk factors and interest rates (see Codogno, Favero and Missale, 2003)3. 
                                                 
2 They report that the United Kingdom held the highest share of foreign assets as a function of total financial wealth (24%); Spain had the smallest 
(5%), and the Netherlands, Germany and Italy had shares around 17%. Moreover, as expected, for bills and bonds, the level of diversification was 
substantial only for banks in the UK, France and the Netherlands, i.e. the countries where intermediaries played an important role as market-makers 
in the eurobond markets. These results are consistent with Tesar and Werner (1995), who present evidence on long-term international investment 
patterns in Canada, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US during the 1970-1990 period. At the beginning of the 1990s, the UK led this sample in 
international portfolio diversification, with foreign security holdings of 32% (compared with 10% in Germany).  
 
3 Our specification will be based on Codogno, Favero and Missale (2003), but with some important differences. First, the models do not control for 
the same variables. Second, their sample period for the daily estimation spans only 2002 (which is not included in the analysis presented in this 
paper). Third, their liquidity variables have been drawn from MTS, so they only correspond to the trading activity that takes place in that economic 
platform rather than in the whole of the euro-securities market. Consequently, the results are not really comparable. 
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The analysis in this paper will then be threefold: first, we break down the European yield spreads into their two main 
domestic components (market liquidity and credit risk differences) which remained after the removal of currency risk. 
Second, we examine whether there was a change in the price assigned to them by markets after the introduction of the 
euro which might explain the yield spread behaviour observed. Third, we will examine the effects of international risk 
factors on yield differentials. The main goal of the analysis will be to identify the possible factors behind the observed 
average increase of 11.98 basis points in yield spreads during the first three years of Monetary Union, once they are 
corrected from the exchange rate factor (following Favero, Giavazzi and Spaventa (1997) we will correct pre-EMU 
spreads by estimating the foreign exchange factor as the differential between the 10 year swap rate in the currency of 
denomination of the bond and the 10 year swap rate in Deutsche marks) 
The sample is composed of daily data from January 1996 to December 2001 (therefore, the same time interval - three 
years - will be considered for both pre-EMU and EMU periods) and includes all EMU countries except Luxembourg 
(whose public debt market is negligible), and Greece (which did not join Monetary Union until January 2001).   
We will present the results of four different specifications4: (I) a static panel regression, (II) a dynamic panel regression, 
(III) a static regression for each individual country, and (IV) a dynamic regression for every individual country, with the 
same explanatory variables in all four. The relative debt-to-GDP ratio will be used to identify differences in default risk, 
while two different variables will be used to capture market liquidity: the bid/ask spread (a proxy of market tightness) 
and on-the-run/off-the-run differentials (a complementary measure of market liquidity).  Finally, the spread between 10-
year fixed interest rates on US swaps and the yield on 10-year Moody’s Seasoned AAA US corporate bonds is 
introduced in the model as a proxy of international risk factors. To the best of our knowledge, no empirical analysis to 
date has used a daily dataset for two of the most important measures of liquidity, the bid/ask spreads and on-the 
run/off-the run yield differentials, corresponding to the trading activity in the whole of the euro-securities market.   
The results of all the specifications are highly consistent, providing evidence that market size scale economies increased 
with Currency Union and that the rise was higher in smaller debt markets. A change in the market assessment of 
domestic (both liquidity and default risk) rather than international factors (which would play a smaller role) might be 
behind the observed increase in adjusted spreads with Monetary Integration, even though their effect varies according to 
                                                 
4 The results are consistent with those presented in Gómez-Puig (2005), even though different variables are used to capture domestic risk factors. In 
particular, in this new set of specifications, we will use the debt-to-GDP ratio instead of the rating differential as a proxy of credit risk. This change 
will not allow us to use the relative level of indebtedness as a proxy of market liquidity; otherwise, multicollinearity would pose a significant problem. 
This is the reason why both the bid/ask and the on-the-run/off-the-run spreads are the variables used to capture market liquidity.  
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market size.  Hence, the empirical evidence suggests that the removal of the exchange rate barrier has penalised small 
markets, not only because they are potentially more illiquid, but also because after EMU the “too big to fail” theory 
seems to hold: that is, the smaller the market, the higher the credibility of the “no-bail-out” rule. So, in the current 
context of increased competition between euro-area government securities markets, their relative success might be 
dependent on their size.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 explains the foreign exchange correction applied in the pre-EMU 
period. Section 3 outlines evidence concerning Monetary Integration in Europe and the evolution of the relative cost of 
borrowing. Section 4 focuses on the various domestic and international factors to which adjusted spreads might be 
sensitive, and describes the data. Section 5 explains the models and estimation methodology. Section 6 reports the 
results. Lastly, section 7 draws conclusions. 
2. Foreign exchange risk correction in the pre-EMU period. 
As discussed by Favero et al. (1997) a direct measure of the component of yield differentials not related to exchange rate 
factors can be obtained by comparing the yields of assets issued by two different states in two different currencies (say, 
one in Spanish pesetas, the other in D-marks) and the yield spreads in the same currencies and with the same life to 
maturity issued by the same (non-government) subject, or by two otherwise comparable issuers (in the second case, 
apart from the exchange rate risk, other factors influencing yield spreads can then be ignored when differences are 
taken). Candidates for this measure are: (1) long-term bonds issued by the same supra-national organisation (such as the 
World Bank or the European Investment Bank), (2) long-term bonds issued by the private sector, and (3) the fixed 
interest rates on swap contracts. 
Giovannini and Piga (1994) study the differential between the interest rate on an Italian government bond issued in the 
Eurodollar market and a comparable World Bank bond issued in the global market. Alesina et al. (1992) compare 
interest rates on public and private financial instruments denominated in the same currencies in 12 OECD countries. 
And Favero, Giavazzi and Spaventa (1997), Arnold and Lemmen (2001), Blanco (2001) and Codogno, Favero and 
Missale (2003) compare government bond yield differentials and interest rate swap (IRS) differentials. 
Supra-national issues are by definition free of any specific default risk. However, the market for bonds issued by supra-
national organisations is far less liquid and deep than that for government bonds. More importantly, supra-national 
 6 
issues in some currencies are intermittent. On the other hand, corporate bond yields display a relatively volatile cyclical 
behaviour and are not default risk-free. Interest rate swaps may also present problems, as they may be affected by the 
emergence of financial difficulties in the banking sector in a particular country (see Favero, Giavazzi and Spaventa, 
1997). 
However, on balance, the drawbacks of the interest differential on supranational issues or corporate issues seem to be 
greater. So even though it is not a perfect measure, the spread on fixed interest rate swap contracts can therefore be 
used as an indicator of the exchange rate determinant of the yield spread on government bonds, as it seems to be the 
best indicator of this yield spread component.  
Since the early 1980s, interest rate swaps have become a popular vehicle used by many companies and financial 
institutions to hedge against interest rate risk. An interest rate swap is an agreement between two parties to exchange a 
series of interest payments without exchanging the underlying debt (which is denominated in the same currency), 
meaning that the default risk of the underlying asset is not translated into the level of the fixed interest rate on the swap 
contract. In a typical fixed/floating interest rate swap, the first party promises to pay the second at designated intervals a 
stipulated amount of interest calculated at a fixed rate on “the notional principal”. The second party promises to pay the 
first at the same intervals a floating amount of interest on the notional principal calculated according to a floating-rate 
index5. IRS are liquidated by differences, “cash-flow netting”. Essentially, then, an interest rate swap is a series of 
forward contracts on some reference interest rate, such as the Libor (see Bicksler and Chen, 1986).  
The fixed rate is the one that is used to price the interest rate swaps6 IRS usually present a spread over the on-the run 
government bond yield at the same maturity, and their price basically accounts for the counterparty credit risk, the 
liquidity, the market risk of the swap contract, and the exchange-rate risk of the currency of denomination of the swap. 
Nevertheless, it can be assumed that the first three components cancel out when the differential between the 10-year 
                                                 
5 In this paper, the 6-month money Libor rate (in the respective currency) before the EMU and the Euribor after its implementation. 
 
6 I.e. if a 10-year Spanish Peseta IRS is 11.50-11.60, this means that one should pay a fixed interest rate of 11.60% in exchange for the six-month 
Spanish Peseta Libor in the euro-market, or the six-month Libor in order to receive a fixed rate of 11.50%.  
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swap rate of one European country i over, for example, Germany, is taken7. Hence, the swap rate differential is an 
appropriate measure for capturing the exchange-rate change component of yield spreads. 
So we denominate: 
Ii,10       =  10-year  Yield on sovereign bonds of country i 
IRSi,10= 10-year Interest Rate Swap rate of currency i  
Where, considering that differences in tax-regimes have been reduced to insignificant levels during the course of the 
1990s: 
Ii,10=f(DRi,10,Li,10,ERi.,10)                                                                                                                                                    (1) 
DRi,10 = Default risk of country i 10-year sovereign bonds.  
Li,10    = Liquidity of country i 10-year sovereign bonds. 
ERi., 10  = Exchange rate risk of currency i over a 10-year horizon. 
Therefore the 10-year yield differential of country i over Germany will be: 
YIELD SPREADit=[Ii,10-IGE,10]t=f([DRi,10-DRGE,10]t,[Li,10- LGE,10]t , [ERi,10 - ERGE,10]t)                                                       (2) 
Then, approximating:  
[IRSi,10-IRSGE,10]t=[ERi,10-ERGE,10]                                                                                                                                     (3) 
and building up the variable “ADJUSTED SPREADit”, as the difference between the total yield differential and the 
swap rate differential, 
                                                 
7 With regard to the counterparty credit risk, not only are most of the participants present in the different currency segments of the underlying swap 
market (the euro-deposit market) the same, but also the counterparty credit risk associated with swap rates is currently very low given the set of 
collateralisation and documentation standards recently developed by dealers and customers (see Liu, Longstaff and Mandell (2002), Duffie and 
Singleton (1997) and He (2000)). Secondly, market risk derives from the uncertainty associated with the floating leg of the swap contract (the six-month 
Libor rate). However, because market risk is usually highly correlated within euro-currency IRS contracts, it can also be ignored when differentials are 
taken. Finally, with respect to the liquidity of swaps contracts, it is reasonable to assume that, although they are currently very liquid (see BIS statistics), 
their liquidity will be highly correlated with that of the underlying government bonds. Therefore, it may vary within currencies. In this case, the 
estimated foreign exchange component (the swap rate differential) of total yield differentials would be biased upward and, consequently, the credit and 
liquidity component of government bonds would be biased downward. However, the data (see table 1) show an increase in the yield spread in the 
EMU period for countries in which the swap differential was not significant in the pre-EMU period. This is the case of Austria, Belgium, France and 
the Netherlands. This finding indicates that the aforementioned biases do not fully explain the rise in the price of liquidity and credit risk, when yield 
spreads are corrected for the foreign exchange factor and support the use of the swap rate differential as an appropriate measure for capturing the 
exchange-rate change component of yield spreads.  
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ADJUSTED SPREADit     = ASPREADit  =  
                                       = [Ii,10 - IGE,10]t  – [IRSi,10 - IRSGE,10]t = 
                                       = f([DRi,10-DRGE,10]t,[Li,10-LGE,10]t,[ERi,10-ERGE,10]t)- [ERi,10 - ERGE,10]t                                         (4) 
it can be inferred that the variable ASPREADit, which will be used as the dependent variable, will mainly account for 
credit risk and market liquidity differences8 of country i sovereign securities over Germany. So, this variable could be 
considered an appropriate indicator of yield differential components not related to exchange rate factors. 
3. Monetary integration and the relative cost of borrowing: Some evidence. 
The aforementioned elimination of two of the main components of yield differentials prompted a substantial 
convergence in total yield differentials over 10-year German bond yields during the period January 1999-December 
2001.  
[Insert Figure 1 and Tables 1a and 1b about here] 
This is shown in figure 1 and table 1a: the average spread over German yields decreased from 58.22 to 25.24 basis 
points. Nevertheless, convergence only implied a sizeable reduction in the relative borrowing costs for the countries that 
presented wider spreads, lower rating and higher foreign exchange risk: that is, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and to a lesser 
extent Finland and Ireland. Conversely, the countries that took less advantage of the elimination of the exchange rate 
risk, Austria, Belgium, France, and the Netherlands, experienced an increase in their relative borrowing costs (15.34, 
13.24, 11.08 and 16.92 basis points, on average, respectively, see table 1b). To sum up, while average gross yield spreads 
(relative to Germany) declined after EMU, they rose in 4 of the 9 countries.  
[Insert Figure 2 and Figure 3 about here] 
Moreover, what is really puzzling is that once adjusted for the swap differential (see figure 2), spreads rose for all 9 
countries with Currency Union. The average value is 25.21 basis points in the EMU period compared with 13.23 basis 
points before EMU (see figure 3 and tables 1a and 1b). This clearly supports the idea that a change in either domestic 
(market liquidity or credit risk values) or international risk factors, or in their  market pricing, might have occurred with 
                                                 
8 We are not considering the effect of international risk factors in this breakdown. 
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the euro, resulting in higher than expected borrowing costs. The main goal of this paper is to find an explanation for 
these rising yield spreads.   
One possible explanation, which is supported by the beliefs of both market participants and member state debt 
managers, could be that in the actual context of increased competition between euro-area government securities markets 
their success might be limited by the extent of their liquidity and market size. Specifically, as the German sovereign debt 
market is the second largest in the euro-area (only surpassed by the Italian), a concentration of trading activity in the 
German market might have occurred and, consequently, wider liquidity differences vis-à-vis German bonds might have 
been translated into higher adjusted spreads9.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
More precisely, table 2 shows that while three countries, Italy, Germany, and France, represented 71.61% of the euro-
area market, four other countries, Austria, Finland, Portugal, and Ireland accounted for only 5.43% of the total. 
Therefore, given (1) these large size differences observed between euro-area sovereign debt markets and (2) the fact that 
with the removal of the foreign exchange risk barrier captive domestic markets might have tended to decrease, it is likely 
that market size and liquidity differences within markets will have become more important.  
Some literature supports the importance of market size in the success of a debt market. Martin and Rey (2004) show 
that in general size matters for asset trade, meaning that a larger country will benefit from higher asset prices than a 
smaller one, and point out that these market size effects are reminiscent of the home market effect in the new trade and 
geography literatures (Helpman and Krugman, 1985). As in the trade literature, these effects come from the 
combination of imperfect substitution and transaction costs. McCauley and Remolona (2000) note that if substantial 
fixed costs are involved in the production of information about the future path of interest rates, the size of the whole 
debt market matters. They calculate that there may be a size threshold around $100-200 billions. Below this level, they 
state that sustaining a liquid government market may not be easy. In the euro-area, only five countries (Italy, Germany, 
France, Spain and Belgium) surpassed that threshold10. Economides and Siow (1988) point out that there may be a 
trade-off between liquidity and market size: the smaller the market, the lower the outstanding volume traded in it. 
Therefore, the more difficult it will be for investors to process and evaluate information about securities traded in that 
                                                 
9 The existence of a very liquid futures bond market in Germany also represents an additional advantage of holding German bonds. 
10 Austria, Finland, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal present an overall amount of public sector outstanding debt below the $100 billion level, while The 
Netherlands entire amount of outstanding public debt is between $100 and $200 billions.  
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market, and the higher the transaction costs and the liquidity premium. Moreover, if size matters for liquidity, “ex-ante” 
traders would prefer bigger and liquid markets (they will present lower price volatility, bigger scale economies and higher 
probability of a favourable match) to small and illiquid markets. Consequently, liquidity will be “self-reinforcing”: since 
traders prefer to participate in liquid markets, more traders will participate in them, and more liquid they will be. This 
self-fulfilling nature of liquidity is also outlined by Plantin (2003)11.   
On the other hand, in a scenario where EMU denies governments the emergency exit of money creation and forbids 
both the ECB and the EU to bail out troubled governments, another possible explanation for the observed rise in 
adjusted spreads could be a high degree of credibility for the “no-bail-out” clause. Consequently, it is vital to assess 
whether the too big to fail theory (TBTF), taken from the banking system12 , might also hold in sovereign debt markets; 
if it does apply, the removal of the exchange rate barrier would have punished smaller countries twice, by making them 
pay both a higher liquidity and higher default risk premium than large ones. In this sense, in the banking system, as 
Kaufman (2002) points out, the TBTF theory states that adverse shocks from bank failures are perceived to be more 
strongly and widely felt (the existence of serious contagion and systemic risk makes regulators perceive that widespread 
devastation could result from a large bank failing) than similar shocks from the failure of non-bank firms of equal size, 
and the larger the bank, the more serious and widespread the damage. In the same vein, Goodhart and Huang (2005) 
develop a model of the lender of last resort from a Central Bank viewpoint. Consistent with the TBTF theory, their 
model suggests that the Central Bank will only rescue banks which are above a threshold size. Analogously, because 
adverse macroeconomic shocks and contagion consequences to neighbouring countries are much greater the larger the 
country’s debt market, agents might expect that, beyond a certain threshold size, governments will receive financial 
support in case of fiscal distress in the form of a bail-out. Consequently, while big countries’ default risk premium  
should not change (or may even decrease) with EMU, for small countries (whose public debt market does not reach the 
                                                 
11 The central intuition of his model is that liquidity is self-fulfilling because deals create positive externalities by increasing the depth of the secondary  
     market, and thus the price of a future resale.  
 
12 Too big to fail (TBTF) is a term frequently used in banking to describe how bank regulators may deal with severely financially troubled banks. The 
term came into common usage in 1984, when the regulators were faced with the economically insolvent Continental Illinois National in Chicago, 
which was both the seventh largest bank in the country at the time and the largest correspondent bank having interbank deposit and Fed funds 
relationships with more than 2,200 other banks. The federal regulators did not legally close the bank and protected all uninsured depositors and 
creditors against loss. In addition, at least initially, the old shareholders were not ousted. The Continental case was resolved in this way, in part, 
because the regulators believed that, particularly because of its large size and broad interconnections with other banks, allowing the bank and/or its 
parent bank holding company to fail and imposing losses on its uninsured depositors and creditors would have serious, adverse effects on other 
banks, financial markets, and the macroeconomy (see Kaufman, 2002).  
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threshold size), agents might expect the “no-bail-out” rule to hold. So, their default risk should increase with their 
membership of Monetary Union, since they lose monetary authority.  
4. Domestic and international risk factors explaining adjusted yield spreads.  
Now that we have defined the dependent variable (ASPREADit) which allows separation of the liquidity and credit risk 
components from expected exchange-rate depreciation, a decomposition between the liquidity premium and the credit-
risk component is attempted by modelling their behaviour to a number of factors that potentially affect only one of 
them.  
With regard to domestic risk factors, a crucial issue in this paper (and one that is vital for policymaking) is the 
identification of the two main domestic sources of risk that have composed yield spreads since the start of Monetary 
Integration: (1) differences in credit risk and (2) differences in market liquidity. With this goal in mind the relative debt-
to-GDP ratio will be used as a proxy to measure differences in credit risk. This variable has been widely used in the 
literature by other authors (Bayoumi, Goldstein and Woglom (1995) among them)13 and presents the advantage over 
other measures such as the rating differential that it cannot be considered an ex-post measure of fiscal sustainability. 
Because market liquidity is an elusive concept, we use the definition provided by the Bank for International Settlements 
(1999): “a liquid market as a market where participants can rapidly execute a large volume of transactions with a small 
impact on prices14”. In this paper, two different proxy variables will be used to measure this effect: (i) the bid/ask 
spread, and (ii) the on-the run/off-the run spread. 
 
                                                 
13 In particular, these authors find support for the market discipline hypothesis in the U.S. bond markets. This hypothesis assumes that yields rise 
smoothly at an increasing rate with the level of borrowing. However, if these incentives prove ineffective, credit markets will eventually respond by 
denying irresponsible borrowers further access to credit. Nevertheless, the model presented in this paper and Bayoumi et al. model do not control 
for the same variables and cannot be compared. 
 
14 Likewise, they point out that the usual approach is to consider market liquidity according to at least one of three possible dimensions: tightness, 
depth and resiliency. Tightness is how far transaction prices diverge from mid-market prices, and can generally be measured by the bid/ask spread. 
Depth denotes either the volume of trades possible without affecting prevailing market prices, or the amount of orders on the order books of market 
makers at a given time. Resiliency refers to the speed with which price fluctuations resulting from trades are dissipated, or the speed with which 
imbalances in order flows are adjusted. However, other measures, though they do not directly coincide with these three dimensions, are often 
regarded as readily observable proxies of market liquidity: the number and volume of trades, trade frequency, turnover ratio, price volatility, the 
number of market participants, the yield spread between the “on the run” and the “off the run” issues, the outstanding volume of a specific security, 
or the overall outstanding volume of securities traded in one market, among others. 
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(i) The bid/ask spread.  
This variable is often used as a measure of liquidity because it reflects the cost incurred by a typical investor in 
unwinding an asset position and measures one of the most important dimensions of liquidity: tightness, i.e. how far 
transaction prices differ from mid-market prices. Additionally, the liquidity of an asset is generally understood as the 
ease of its conversion into money. Therefore, because the conversion of an asset into money involves certain costs 
(searching costs, delays, broker’s commissions, etc…), the higher these costs, the lower the degree of liquidity. Note that 
as market dealers reduce their liquidity risk, the bid/ask spread should narrow with trading activity.  
(ii) The on-the run/off-the run spread.  
The yield spread between more and less liquid securities is also a liquidity measure used in the Treasury market (see 
Fleming, 2003). Since liquidity has value, more liquid securities tend to have higher prices (lower yields) than less liquid 
securities. The yield spread is often calculated as the difference between the yield of an off-the-run (older securities of a 
given maturity) and that of an on-the-run (benchmark) security with similar cash-flow characteristics. Positive spreads 
indicate that on-the-run securities are trading at a yield discount (or price premium) to off-the-run securities. This spread 
provides an insight into the value of liquidity not provided by other measures like the bid/ask spread. The fact that both 
measures of liquidity are so different15 is the reason why their correlation coefficient is not significant. On the other 
hand, the correlation coefficient between these liquidity variables and the credit risk proxy (the relative debt-to-GDP 
ratio) is not significant either. Therefore, we can assume that the estimation results will not suffer from multicollinearity 
problems16.  
To sum up, the two variables described will be used in our models to control for market liquidity.  However, for the 
sake of fairness, it has to be noted that measuring the liquidity premium remains a difficult issue because market liquidity 
and credit risk interact with each other. The lack of liquidity increases the effect of risk. This is because liquidity 
variables, such as the bid-ask spread, reflect the risk borne by market makers in managing unbalanced positions. As 
credit risk increases, so does the risk they face. A (credit-related) flight-to-quality argument might also be used to 
                                                 
15 Bid/ask spreads series used in this paper are only related to the “on-the-run” issues and show the differential between the bid and ask quotations for 
the “benchmark” or  “on-the-run” issue at every moment of time.  
 
16 Conversely, multicollinearity would appear if we estimated a model with the proxy of market liquidity used in Gómez-Puig (2005) -the relative level 
of indebtedness- together with the relative debt-to-GDP ratio because these two variables present a high correlation coefficient indeed.     
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interpret the significance of the on-the-run/off-the-run differentials17. In these circumstances, the results presented in 
this paper turn out to be highly consistent; they indicate that, since EMU, the market assessment of both liquidity and 
credit risk factors has been closely related inside countries, as it depends on the size of their debt market.  
Lastly, a third point that will be assessed in this paper is the relevance of international risk factors on yield spreads. 
Hence, the analysis will also build on the findings of some recent work according to which yields spreads on eurozone 
government securities are sensitive to international risk factors18.  
As defined in section 2, the dependent variable is ASPREADit , i.e. the difference between the total yield differential of 
10-year government bonds and the 10-year interest rate swap differential. The sample comprises daily data spanning the 
period January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2001. Yields and swap rates are obtained from Datastream and correspond to 
the “on the run” (benchmark) 10-year issue for each market at every moment of time. They are quoted rates at market 
close.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Datastream creates continuous yield series by taking the yield from the current benchmark in each market and using it 
to update a separate time series. As a benchmark changes, data are taken from a new stock on the first day of the 
month. Table 3 presents the starting benchmark dates used by Datastream as well as the characteristics of the different 
benchmarks that compose the yield and swap series.  
With regard to the bid/ask spreads series, daily time-series have been created by calculating the spread between the bid 
and ask quotations provided by Bloomberg for the “on the run” (benchmark) 10-year issue for each market at every 
moment of time, using the same benchmarks and starting dates that Datastream uses to create the 10-year yields and 
swap rates series (see table 3). For all the different issues Bloomberg provides daily quoted prices calculated as the 
average bid and ask quotations at the close. 
A similar methodology was used to build the on-the-run/off-the-run spread daily time-series. These series were created 
by calculating the differences between the “on the run” (benchmark) 10-year issue and the “off the run” (immediately 
                                                 
17 See Vayanos (2004) among others. 
18 See Codogno, Favero and Missale (2003) or Bernoth et al. (2004) among others. 
 14 
older security) 10-year issue yields provided by Bloomberg for each market at every moment of time, also using the 
same benchmarks and starting dates that Datastream uses to create the 10-year yields and swap rates series (see table 3).  
The overall outstanding amounts of public debt data have been drawn from the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS; see table 2) and the GDP from Eurostat (in the case of Ireland, the Central Statistics Office). However, as these 
series are only provided with quarterly frequency, for the construction of the relative debt-to-GDP ratio daily time-
series, the rest of the data have been extrapolated assuming a daily constant rate of increase of those volumes, which in 
fact present very slight differences within countries over the studied period. For this reason, it can be assumed that the 
extrapolation will not produce important biases in the data and can be applied in this case. 
And finally, the spread between 10-year fixed interest rates on US swaps and the yield on 10-year Moody’s Seasoned 
AAA US corporate bonds (USSPREADit), has been calculated from daily data obtained from Datastream.   
All the variables included in the estimation that capture domestic risk factors are in relative terms to the German ones, 
as our dependent variable (ASPREADit) is the difference between the total yield differential and the swap differential of 
country i over Germany. Therefore, BIDASKDIFit is the difference between the bid/ask spread in country i and the 
bid/ask spread in Germany, ONOFFDIFit  is the difference between the on the run /off the run spread in country i and 
that in Germany, and LNDEBTGDPit is the (log) deviation of country i debt-to-GDP ratio from Germany’s debt-to-
GDP ratio.  
5. Modelling adjusted yield spread behaviour. 
5.1. Panel models with both domestic and international factors.  
 
The first and second specifications will be panel regressions that include nine groups or countries. In these 
specifications, in addition to the variables already mentioned in the introduction (LNDEBTGDPit, BIDASKDIFit,, 
ONOFFDIFit,, and USSPREADit), country dummy variables and monthly dummy variables will  be introduced, in order to 
capture the potential existence of both specific features via country and temporal effects. Besides, as the goal is to 
analyse if the marginal effect of the different variables changed with EMU, a dummy (DPRE), that takes the value 1 in 
the pre-EMU period (and 0, otherwise), will also be introduced and the coefficients of the interactions between this 
dummy and the rest of variables will be calculated. Finally, in order to assess if there exists a varying relationship 
between liquidity variables and the yield ASPREADSit (if liquidity is self-fulfilling, the proxies of market liquidity might 
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present a non-linear relationship, i.e. a liquid/illiquid market might lead to an increasingly lower/higher liquidity 
premium) a quadratic specification for the variables BIDASKDIFit, and  ONOFFDIFit  will be formulated. So, with the 
following defined previously: 
BIDASKDIF2it =  (BIDASKDIF)
2
it 
ONOFFDIF2it =   (ONOFFDIF)
2
it 
The domestic risk variables (DRVit) will be: 
DRVit=(LNDEBTGDPit,BIDASKDIFit,BIDASKDIF2it, ONOFFDIFit,ONOFFDIF2it)                                                                    (5) 
While the international risk variables (IRVit)  will be: 
IRVit=USSPREADit                                                                                                                                                        (6) 
The international risk variable that allows adjusted spreads to be explained in terms of exogenous risk premiums 
(specifically, banking risk premiums in the United States) will appear in the regression both linearly, and interacting with 
the domestic risk variables. This captures the idea that international risk affects adjusted yield differentials because 
Eurozone government bonds are imperfect substitutes due to differences in either market liquidity or default risk. 
Therefore, the interaction term identifies changes in adjusted spreads that can be entirely attributed to domestic risk 
differentials. However, the linear term is also necessary, as international factors might affect the adjusted yield spread 
either because of “structural” differences in market liquidity or differences in non-varying unobservable fundamentals, 
such as the reputation of the issuing governments. Hence, the independent effect of domestic risk variables on adjusted 
spreads is also controlled by entering these variables linearly in the regressions.   
I. STATIC PANEL MODEL 
Therefore, the first panel model with both domestic and international risk variables will be: 
yit = i + Xit +γDPREit +δMONTHLYDUMMIESt  + λCOUNTRYDUMMIESi + it                                               
where, with the international (IRVit) and domestic risk variables (DRVit,) previously defined, 
the vector of independent variables will be: 
 Xit=(IRVit,DRVit,DRVit*IRVit)                                                                                                                                      (7) 
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II. DYNAMIC  PANEL MODEL 
In the second estimated model, taking into account that some aspects of both credit risk and market liquidity do not 
change over the considered period, the objective will be to identify the relative importance of liquidity and default 
premiums in explaining fluctuations, rather than levels of yield differentials. With this aim a lag of the dependent 
variable will be introduced in the model, which will allow for a slow dynamic adjustment to a long-term equilibrium 
value of the variable ASPREADit. 
So, we will estimate the same model as in specification I:   
yit = i + Xit +γDPREit +δMONTHLYDUMMIESt  + λCOUNTRYDUMMIESi + it                                                 
including a lag of the dependent variable in the vector of independent variables: 
 Xit=(yit-1,IRVit,DRVit,DRVit*IRVit)                                                                                                                                 (8)                                                           
In addition,  
=1+2DPREit                                                                                                                                                              (9) 
We honestly think that a formal coefficient test  H0 :  1 =1+2. , in order to assess whether the impact of independent 
variables on the adjusted interest differential changed significantly with the start of EMU, is not necessary as long as 2 
turns out to be significant. Therefore, for both models I and II; the marginal effect of a variable will be: 
 = 1 (in the EMU period), and  
 = 1 + 2 (pre-EMU) 
5.2. Regressions for every individual country. 
In the two panel regressions above, all country dummies (with the exception of those of Ireland and Finland) turn out 
to be significant at the 5 percent confidence level, meaning that specific factors in each different country are relevant 
and suggesting that a separate estimation for each of them will provide wider information. We will do this in the third 
and fourth sets of regressions where, using the same independent variables as in the panel regressions I and II, both 
static and dynamic estimations will be implemented separately for each nine euro countries that are included in the 
sample. 
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Therefore, the following empirical model on daily data will be implemented separately for each individual country:  
yit=i+Xit+γDPREit+it                                                                                                                                                (10) 
Hence, two sets of regressions (III and IV) will be calculated using the same estimation equations as in section 5.1.  
6. Results. 
The estimation methods used in all specifications, Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) in panel estimations and a 
regression with Newey-West standard errors in the estimations for each euro-country, are robust to the possible 
existence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the error terms.  
The results of all four specifications are highly consistent and provide evidence that market size scale economies have 
increased with Currency Union and that this increase is higher the smaller the debt market. A change in the market 
assessment of domestic risk factors (both liquidity and credit risk) rather than international factors might be behind the 
observed increase in adjusted spreads with Monetary Integration, even though the effect differs according to the size of 
the market.   
Tables 4 to 7 present respectively the values and standard errors of the estimated coefficients corresponding to the first, 
second, third, and fourth specifications. For each exogenous variable, these tables allow calculation of the corresponding 
marginal effects for the EMU period (1) and the pre-EMU (1+ 2), from the estimated coefficient values. 
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here] 
Tables 4 and 5 present the results from the panel regressions (static and dynamic) that correspond to models I and II. 
Apart from the fact that in the dynamic model the lag of the dependent variable is significant (even though its marginal 
effect over aspreads decreases with EMU) the results from both specifications present only slight differences. They 
show an increase in the marginal impact of market liquidity’s variables since Monetary Union. Both linear terms of the 
on-the-run/off-the-run and the bid/ask spread increase with the euro. On the other hand, when it is interacted with the 
international risk variable (which, though significant in both specifications, only experiences an increase in its marginal 
effect with the euro in the static model), the behaviour of the on-the-run/off-the-run variable is non-linear, suggesting 
that liquidity is self-fulfilling. Moreover, its marginal impact also rises with EMU. With regard to the default risk variable 
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behaviour, tables 4 and 5 show that its significance has increased since the beginning of the EMU (which would support 
a high degree of credibility for the “no-bail-out” rule).  
[Insert Table 6 and Table 7 about here] 
The country-specific estimations (see tables 6 and 7 corresponding to models III and IV) suggest a substantial decrease 
in the significance of the lag dependent variable (which captures the structural aspects of both credit risk and market 
liquidity) in the EMU period (table 7), except in countries that present a high debt-to-GDP ratio relative to Germany. 
Actually, the effect decreases in the case of Finland, France, the Netherlands and Portugal, remains unchanged in the 
case of Austria, and rises for Ireland, Italy, Belgium, and Spain. Therefore, with Currency Union, adjusted spreads are, in 
general, less sensitive to structural differences in market liquidity or credit risk, except in the countries where debt 
sustainability is more likely to be a problem19. This is the most important result obtained from the dynamic model; in 
general, the static specification (see table 6) seems to bring more information because the significance of the majority of 
the variables decreases when a lag of the dependent variable is included in the estimation. 
Table 6 presents very interesting results. First, the variation in the marginal impact of the default risk variable in the 
EMU period differs according to the size of the market. Therefore, while in small markets the marginal effect increases 
(as in the Netherlands) or remains positive in spite of falling (as in Austria and Finland), in larger and more indebted 
countries20 the impact either remains negative (as in Belgium) or becomes negative (as in Italy, Spain and Portugal). This 
clearly supports the idea that the FBTF theory holds in sovereign debt markets, since it reinforces the relevance of 
market size in the degree of explanatory power of credit risk variables. In addition, the majority of the countries that 
present an increase in the marginal effect of one of the market liquidity proxies in the EMU period have either very 
small or very large government debt markets. For instance, with EMU, the non-linear behaviour of one of the market 
liquidity variables included in the model (the on-the-run/off-the-run spreads) is particularly notable in two of the 
smallest (Austria and Finland) and two of the largest markets (France and Spain). Analogously, for the smallest and the 
biggest debt markets (Ireland and Italy, respectively) the non-linear term of the bid/ask spread rises since EMU. This 
non-linear behaviour of market liquidity variables (if they increase/decrease, liquidity premium rises/drops at an 
                                                 
19 This is clearly not the case of Ireland. However, the results obtained for this country should be interpreted with caution because the number of 
available observations is substantially smaller than for the other countries.  
 
20 During the period 1996-2001, on average, the three countries with the larger ratio debt-to-GDP were: Belgium (102.49%), Italy (95.36%) and Spain 
(48.82%).  
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increasing rate), especially in small and large debt markets, supports the idea that liquidity is self-fulfilling. So as 
Economides and Siow (1988) point out, since traders prefer to participate in liquid markets, their transactions will flee 
from illiquid to more liquid markets, fostering a liquidity trade-off from the small to larger debt markets. On the other 
hand, the international risk variable marginal impact (unlike panel regressions I and II) in the few cases where it is 
significant becomes negative with the euro. Therefore, the adjusted spread increase with Currency Union may be due to 
domestic risk factors rather than to international ones. However, when the variable that captures international risk is 
interacted with the linear term of some market liquidity proxies the marginal impact over adjusted spreads registers a 
change in the EMU period for some small markets: for instance, when it is interacted with the on-the-run/off-the-run 
spread, the marginal effect increases once again in Austria and Finland (two of the smallest debt markets in the EMU). 
To conclude, in both specifications (static and dynamic) the constant (which should capture other factors affecting 
adjusted yield spread fluctuations) is always significant except in the case of France and Ireland.  
7. Conclusions 
Euro-area countries’ adjusted spreads over 10-yr German securities experienced an average rise of 11.98 basis points in 
the first three years of Monetary Union. This resulted in a lower than expected decrease in the costs of borrowing 
(which actually increased in the case of Austria, Belgium, France and the Netherlands). Therefore, changes either in 
domestic risk factors (market liquidity and/or credit risk), in international risk factors or in their market pricing  may 
have occurred with EMU.  
The results of all specifications are highly consistent; they provide evidence that market size scale economies seem to 
have increased with Currency Union and that the smaller the debt market, the higher the rise. Specifically, a change in 
the market assessment of domestic (both liquidity and default risk) rather than international factors (which would only 
play a smaller role) might be behind the increase observed in adjusted spreads with Monetary Integration, even though  
the effect differs according to the size of the market21. Therefore, the removal of the exchange rate barrier seems to 
have punished smaller countries twice (they are forced to compete in terms of liquidity with larger countries for the 
same pool of funding, only being able to offer smaller bond issues), by making them pay both higher liquidity and a 
higher default risk premium than larger ones. This empirical evidence is also in concordance with the fact that the three 
                                                 
21 These results seem consistent; they point out that, since EMU, market assessment of both liquidity and default risk (whose measurement, see p.12 in 
section 4, is difficult because the two variables interact with each other) is closely related within countries as it depends on the size of their debt 
market. 
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countries that account for around 59% of the euro-area government securities markets (Italy, France and Spain) are 
precisely the ones with lowest adjusted spread rise since Monetary Integration (see tables 1a and 1b).  
As mentioned, international risk factors appear less significant than local ones in explaining adjusted spread changes. In 
addition, default risk only seems to be relevant when it is accompanied by a small market size. These results then show 
that the theory “too big to fail” holds: it is expected that large countries will receive financial support in case of fiscal 
distress (bail-out). This explains why the default risk premium has decreased for some big countries since EMU. In 
small countries, on the other hand, markets expect that the “no-bail-out” clause will hold, and membership of the 
monetary union has increased the default risk since these countries have lost monetary authority. In Italy, for instance, in 
spite of its very high debt-to-GDP ratio, the associated default risk might be compensated by both the increased 
liquidity characteristic of a big market and the lack of credibility of the no-bail-out clause.  
Finally, these results reinforce the self-fulfilling nature of market liquidity. Both in the case of the smallest or the largest 
debt markets, illiquidity or liquidity presents a non-linear behaviour that supports the idea that traders’ transactions flee 
from illiquid to liquid debt markets. So, the more liquid (illiquid) a market is, the more traders want (do not want) to 
participate in it, resulting in an increase (decrease) in the liquidity of the market.  In particular, as the German sovereign 
debt market is the second-biggest in the euro-area (only surpassed by the Italian), both a concentration of trading 
activity and a drop in the credibility of the “no-bail-out” rule might have occurred in the German market. Consequently, 
wider liquidity and perceived default risk differences vis-à-vis German bonds might have been transformed into higher 
adjusted spreads.  
To conclude, with the introduction of a common currency and in the current context of higher competition between 
euro-area government securities markets, the success of euro-area sovereign securities debt markets may be highly 
dependent on their market size.  
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FIGURE 1  
NOTE:  Yield differential = (Ii – IDM), where Ii is the 10-year yield on country i government bonds and IDM is the 10-
year yield on Germany government bonds. 
Source : Datastream 
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FIGURE 2   
 
NOTE: Swap differential = (IRSi – IRSDM), where IRSi is the 10-year interest rate swap of currency i and IRSDM  is the 
10-year interest rate swap of  the D-mark. 
Source :Datastream 
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FIGURE 3 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Adjusted  yield spread = Yield differential – Swap differential = (Ii - IDM) – (IRSi – IRSDM). Source: Datastream. 
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                       TABLE 1a      
 
 
NOTE: AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, FI: Finland, FR: France, IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, NL: The Netherlands, PT: Portugal, 
SP: Spain. Source: Datastream.  
(Ii- IDM) = 10-year yield difference over Germany 
(IRSi – IRSDM) = 10-year interest rate swap difference over Germany 
ASPREADi = (Ii- IDM) - (IRSi – IRSDM) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRE-EMU (1996-1998) EMU (1999-2001)
(Ii-IDM) (IRSi-IRSDM) ASPREADi (Ii-IDM) (IRSi-IRSDM) ASPREADi
(1) (2) (3)=(1)-(2) (4) (5) (6)=(4)-(5)
AT 9.07 -0.33 9.40 24.42 -0.01 24.43
BE 33.06 4.29 28.77 46.30 -0.01 46.31
FI 43.56 41.31 2.25 21.95 -0.01 21.96
FR 2.97 -3.10 6.07 14.05 0.00 14.05
IE 50.52 43.84 6.68 14.78 0.00 14.78
IT 157.73 133.04 24.69 32.32 0.05 32.27
NL -2.70 -3.52 0.83 14.22 -0.01 14.23
PT 111.73 91.42 20.31 31.85 0.22 31.63
SP 118.06 97.99 20.07 27.24 0.04 27.20
Average 58.22 44.99 13.23 25.24 0.03 25.21
St.dev. 57.48 51.37 10.33 10.66 0.08 10.64
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                                                  TABLE 1b 
 
 
NOTE: AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, FI: Finland, FR: France, IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, NL: The Netherlands, PT: Portugal, 
SP: Spain. Source: Datastream.  
(Ii- IDM) = 10-year yield difference over Germany 
(IRSi – IRSDM) = 10-year interest rate swap difference over Germany 
ASPREADi = (Ii- IDM) - (IRSi – IRSDM) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Differences between EMU and pre-EMU
(ii-iDM) ASPREADi
(4)-(1) (6)-(3)
AT 15.34 15.03
BE 13.24 17.53
FI -21.61 19.71
FR 11.08 7.98
IE -35.74 8.10
IT -125.40 7.58
NL 16.92 13.40
PT -79.88 11.31
SP -90.82 7.13
Average -32.99 11.98
St.dev. 53.77 4.69
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TABLE 2 
 
Source: Bank for International Settlements. 
                                    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DOMESTIC DEBT SECURITIES 
PUBLIC SECTOR AMOUNTS OUTSTANDING
(Billions of euros)
  1995-12   1996-12   1997-12   1998-12   1999-12   2000-12 2001-12 average % over EMU
     Ireland 19.93 23.20 23.12 21.93 24.73 24.07 19.95 23.15 0.69
     Portugal 35.19 36.47 32.84 34.04 37.49 42.35 45.61 37.67 1.13
     Finland 33.20 38.15 41.56 44.28 45.60 47.70 46.28 43.39 1.30
     Austria 57.04 58.95 63.87 69.28 86.05 99.74 100.52 76.80 2.30
     Greece 64.10 79.58 84.47 84.80 88.43 96.73 102.20 87.23 2.62
     Netherlands 155.64 159.89 159.68 170.12 178.14 180.98 177.50 171.44 5.14
     Belgium 228.86 230.59 228.41 229.67 231.85 246.18 248.66 236.75 7.10
     Spain 211.07 241.63 259.63 272.41 287.34 311.04 299.43 269.56 8.09
     France 497.35 536.05 565.50 623.91 639.85 708.45 709.23 614.79 18.45
     Germany 676.53 682.74 699.45 738.75 767.35 816.77 790.81 734.97 22.05
     Italy 896.49 1022.19 1011.08 1037.09 1042.62 1088.36 1056.96 1036.69 31.11
     EMU 2875.40 3109.45 3169.63 3326.27 3429.43 3662.37 3597.15 3332.43 100.00
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TABLE 3                             
Starting date as a benchmark Name Coupon Maturity date
AUSTRIA
Dec-95 OESTERREICH 1995 6.5% 17/11/05
Mar-96 OESTERREICH 1996 6.125% 09/02/06
Jul-96 OESTERREICH 1996 6.25% 31/05/06
Nov-96 OESTERREICH 1996 5.875% 15/07/06
Feb-97 OESTERREICH 1997 5.625% 17/01/07
Jun-97 OESTERREICH 1997 5 3/4% 11/04/07
Sep-97 OESTERREICH 1997 5 5/8% 15/07/07
Feb-98 OESTERREICH 1998 5% 15/01/08
Apr-99 OESTERREICH 1999 4% 15/07/09
Dec-99 OESTERREICH 1999 5 1/2% 15/01/10
May-01 OESTERREICH 2001 5 1/4% 04/01/11
BELGIUM
Feb-95 BELGIUM OLO 1994 6.5% 31/03/05
Mar-96 BELGIUM OLO 1995 7% 15/05/06
Jan-97 BELGIUM OLO 1996 6 1/4% 28/03/07
Dec-97 BELGIUM OLO 1997 5 3/4% 28/03/08
Feb-99 BELGIUM OLO 1999 3 3/4% 28/03/09
Feb-00 BELGIUM OLO 2000 5 3/4% 28/09/10
May-01 BELGIUM OLO 2001 5% 28/09/11
FINLAND
Jul-93 FINLAND 1993 9 1/2% 15/03/04
Sep-96 FINLAND 1996 7 1/4% 18/04/06
Dec-97 FINLAND 1997 6% 25/04/08
Dec-98 FINLAND 1998 5% 25/04/09
Feb-00 FINLAND 2000 5 3/4% 23/02/11
FRANCE
Aug-95 OAT FRANCE 1995 7 3/4% 25/10/05
Feb-96 OAT FRANCE 1995 7.25% 25/04/06
Oct-96 OAT FRANCE 1995 6.50% 25/10/06
Apr-97 OAT FRANCE 1996 5.5% 25/04/07
Oct-97 OAT FRANCE 1997 5.5% 25/10/07
Mar-98 OAT FRANCE 1998 5.25% 25/04/08
Nov-98 OAT FRANCE 1998 8.5% 25/10/08
Jan-99 OAT FRANCE 1998 4% 25/04/09
Jul-99 OAT FRANCE 1999 4% 25/10/09
Mar-00 OAT FRANCE 2000 5.5% 25/04/10
Sep-00 OAT FRANCE 2000 5.5% 25/10/10
Jun-01 OAT FRANCE 2001 6.5% 25/04/01
GERMANY
Nov-95 BUNDESREPUB.DTL 1995 6 1/2% 14/10/05
Feb-96 BUNDESREPUB.DTL 1996 6% 05/01/06
Mar-96 BUNDESREPUB.DTL 1996 6% 16/02/06
Jun-96 BUNDESREPUB.DTL 1996 6 1/4% 26/04/06
Feb-97 BUNDESREPUB.DTL 1997 6% 04/01/07
May-97 BUNDESREPUB.DTL 1997 6% 04/07/07
Feb-98 BUNDESREPUB.DTL 1998 5 1/4% 04/01/08
Aug-98 BUNDESREPUB.DTL 1998 4 3/4% 04/07/08
Feb-99 BUNDESREPUB.DTL 1999 3 3/4% 04/01/09
Apr-99 BUNDESREPUB.DTL 1999 4% 04/07/09
Aug-99 BUNDESREPUB.DTL 1999 4 1/2% 04/07/09
Nov-99 BUNDESREPUB.DTL 1999 5 3/8% 04/01/10
Jun-00 BUNDESREPUB.DTL 2000 5 1/4% 04/07/10
Dec-00 BUNDESREPUB.DTL 2000 5 1/4% 04/01/11
Jun-01 BUNDESREPUB.DTL 2001 5% 04/07/11
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TABLE 3 (Continuation) 
Source: Datastream 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IRELAND
Jun-95 IRISH TRSY. 8% 18/08/06
Oct-97 IRISH TRSY. 6% 18/08/08
Jul-99 IRISH TRSY. 4% 18/04/10
ITALY
Sep-95 BTP ITALY 1996 10 1/2% 01/09/05
Jun-96 BTP ITALY 1996 9 1/2% 01/02/06
Nov-96 BTP ITALY 1996 8 3/4% 01/07/06
Feb-97 BTP ITALY 1997 6 3/4% 01/02/07
Oct-97 BTP ITALY 1997 6 3/4% 01/07/07
Feb-98 BTP ITALY 1997 6% 01/11/07
Jul-98 BTP ITALY 1998 5% 01/05/08
Jan-99 BTP ITALY 1998 4 1/2% 01/05/09
Oct-99 BTP ITALY 1999 4 1/4% 01/11/09
Jul-00 BTP ITALY 2000 5 1/2% 01/11/10
Jun-01 BTP ITALY 2001 5 1/4% 01/08/11
NETHERLANDS
Dec-95 NEDERLAND 1995 6 3/4% 15/11/05
Feb-96 NEDERLAND 1995 6% 15/01/06
Feb-97 NEDERLAND 1997 5 3/4% 15/02/07
Feb-98 NEDERLAND 1998 5 1/4% 15/07/08
Feb-99 NEDERLAND 1999 3 3/4% 15/07/09
Feb-00 NEDERLAND 2000 5 1/2% 15/07/10
Apr-01 NEDERLAND 2001 5% 15/07/11
PORTUGAL
Mar-95 PORTUGAL OT 1995 11 7/8% 23/02/05
Jul-96 PORTUGAL OT 1996 9.5% 23/02/06
Mar-97 PORTUGAL OT 1997 6.625% 23/02/07
Jun-98 PORTUGAL OT 1998 5 3/8% 23/06/08
Jul-99 PORTUGAL OT 1999 3.95% 15/07/09
Jun-00 PORTUGAL OT 2000 5.85% 20/05/10
Apr-01 PORTUGAL OT 2001 5.15% 15/06/11
SPAIN
Dec-95 OBLIGACION ESTADO 1995 10.15% 31/01/06
Oct-96 OBLIGACION ESTADO 1996 8.8% 30/04/06
Feb-97 OBLIGACION ESTADO 1996 7.35% 31/03/07
Nov-97 OBLIGACION ESTADO 1997 6% 31/01/08
Jan-99 OBLIGACION ESTADO 1998 5.15% 30/07/09
Jan-00 OBLIGACION ESTADO 1999 4.0% 31/01/10
Feb-01 OBLIGACION ESTADO 2000 5.4% 30/07/11
Oct-01 OBLIGACION ESTADO 2001 5.35% 31/10/11
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TABLES 4 and 5 
Cross-Sectional Time-Serie FGLS Regression.
Sample: Pre-EMU: 1996:01-1998:12
                       EMU: 1999:01-2001:12
dependent variable: ASPREAD
               TABLE 4                TABLE 5
SPECIFICATION I (STATIC MODEL) SPECIFICATION II (DYNAMIC MODEL)
X it ß 1 (X it ) ß 2 (DPRE it *X it ) ß 1 (X it ) ß 2 (DPRE it *X it )
ASPREAD it-1 0.640** 0.114**
(0.010) (0.011)
LNDEBTGDP it 0.181** -0.017** 0.064** -0.014**
(0.008) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001)
ONOFFDIF it 1.782** -1.082** 0.565** -0.301**
(0.104) (0.118) (0.072) (0.079)
ONOFFDIF2 it -10.686** 5.133** -3.374** 1.656
(0.608) (0.616) (0.423) (0.423)
BIDASKDIF it 0.557** -0.386** 0.244** -0.224**
(0.050) (0.075) (0.035) (0.053)
BIDASKDIF2 it - -2.670** - -
(0.742)
USSPREAD it 0.034** -0.018** 0.008* -
(0.007) (0.009) (0.005)
LNDEBTGDP*USSPREAD it 0.050** -0.082** 0.014** -0.024**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
ONOFFDIF*USSPREAD it -1.860** 0.899** -0.590** 0.222**
(0.106) (0.145) (0.076) (0.098)
ONOFFDIF2*USSPREAD it 15.425** -6.340** 4.877** -2.067**
(0.720) (0.726) (0.499) (0.490)
BIDASKDIF*USSPREAD it -0.401** - -0.217** 0.150
(0.059) (0.039) (0.076)
BIDASKDIF2*USSPREAD it - 4.301** 0.651* -
(0.731) (0.403)
λ i λ i 
DBELGIUM -0.121** -0.041**
(0.008) (0.005)
DIRELAND - -
DITALY -0.032** -0.015**
(0.007) (0.005)
DFINLAND -0.009** -
(0.003)
DFRANCE -0.097** -0.033**
(0.002) (0.002)
DNETHERLANDS 0.131** 0.045**
(0.010) (0.007)
DPORTUGAL 0.150** 0.047**
(0.007) (0.005)
DSPAIN 0.027** 0.006**
(0.002) (0.002)
γ    γ    
DPRE it 0.038** -0.017**
(0.009) (0.007)
α α
CONSTANT 0.160** 0.062**
(0.005) (0.004)
Number of observations = 12139 12132
Number of groups = 9 9
Avg obs per group = 1406 1406
Log likelihood = 23893.12 28095.75
Wald chi2 = 53337.41 130752.29
Prob > chi2 = 0.00 0.00
**Significant at 5 percent confidence level.
*Significant at 10 percent confidence level.
Standard Errors within parentheses  
TABLE 6 
SPECIFICATION III (STATIC MODEL)
Regression with Newey-West Standard Errors
Sample: Pre-EMU: 1996:01-1998:12
                       EMU: 1999:01-2001:12
dependent variable: ASPREAD
                               AUSTRIA                                     BELGIUM                                       FINLAND                                    FRANCE                                IRELAND                            ITALY                      THE NETHERLANDS                            PORTUGAL                            SPAIN
X t ß 1 (X t ) ß 2 (DPRE*X t ) ß 1 (X t ) ß 2 (DPRE*X t ) ß 1 (X t ) ß 2 (DPRE*X t ) ß 1 (X t ) ß 2 (DPRE*X t ) ß 1 (X t ) ß 2 (DPRE*X t ) ß 1 (X t ) ß 2 (DPRE*X t ) ß 1 (X t ) ß 2 (DPRE*X t ) ß 1 (X t ) ß 2 (DPRE*X t ) ß 1 (X t ) ß 2 (DPRE*X t )
LNDEBTGDP t 0.916** 1.638** -1.517** - 0.533** 5.500** - - - - -2.373** 5.703** 0.500** -0.298** -1.283** 1.011** -2.071** 5.689**
(0.132) (0.646) (0.324) (0.115) (2.260) (0.165) (0.665) (0.115) (0.117) (0.189) (0.239) (0.251) (0.689)
ONOFFDIF t -2.141** 3.744** -1.365** -2.290** -1.631** 4.524** -1.271** 4.018** - - -1.358** 1.913** - - - 1.594** - -
(0.432) (0.566) (0.577) (0.971) (0.247) (0.924) (0.417) (1.062) (0.390) (0.545) (0.284)
ONOFFDIF2 t 17.615** -15.591* - 18.141** 10.813** -17.480** 23.925** -61.363** 4.766** - - - - - - -7.161** 11.072** -17.219**
(4.855) (8.433) (7.735) (1.750) (2.934) (6.518) (13.129) (2.171) (1.797) (3.385) (5.609)
BIDASKDIF t 0.399** 4.733** -0.320** -3.901** - - -0.578** 4.019** - - - - - -1.344** - -0.348* - 1.236*
(0.186) (1.080) (0.134) (0.914) (0.189) (1.535) (0.239) (0.180) (0.754)
BIDASKDIF2 t -2.041** -93.305** - 84.921** - - - 146.486** 191.559** -281.101** 10.017** -11.053** - 6.816* 6.043** - 17.571** -
(0.948) (30.215) (32.750) (72.806) (95.043) (115.133) (4.474) (4.959) (3.807) (1.015) (2.972)
USSPREAD t - - - - -0.051** 1.262** - 0.629** - -0.450** -1.735** 4.359** -0.659** 0.220** - 0.395** -0.395** 2.494**
(0.018) (0.249) (0.211) (0.227) (0.149) (1.265) (0.162) (0.032) (0.026) (0.056) (0.344)
LNDEBTGDP*USSPREAD t -0.533** -2.561** - - -0.525** -9.975** - - - - 2.079** -4.394** - -0.613** 3.695** -2.920** 2.307** -9.159**
(0.155) (1.222) (0.156) (4.363) (0.170) (1.270) (1.133) (0.277) (0.373) (0.276) (1.154)
ONOFFDIF*USSPREAD t 2.181** -4.813** - 4.377** 1.815** -7.608** - -4.412** 1.413** - 1.773** - - - -2.938** - - 1.561*
(0.648) (0.957) (1.475) (0.312) (1.542) (1.604) (0.619) (0.663) (0.493) (0.863)
ONOFFDIF2*USSPREAD t -22.792** - - -31.968** -12.218** 27.089** -26.901** 95.507** -11.707** - - 24.480* - - - 12.515** -13.033** 21.534**
(7.524) (10.655) (2.041) (4.846) (9.914) (21.334) (3.366) (12.518) (2.087) (5.661) (8.477)
BIDASKDIF*USSPREAD t - -9.074** 0.534** 8.753** - -17.471** - -6.193** 11.310* - - - - 1.291** 1.055** - -0.296* -
(2.057) (0.126) (1.590) (7.304) (2.962) (6.047) (0.321) (0.279) (0.165)
BIDASKDIF2*USSPREAD t - 207.74** - -140.378** - 69.629* -14.353* -256.990* -326.538** 503.828** -17.142** 20.207** - - - -7.152** -26.030** -
(58.660) (60.130) (37.129) (8.074) (144.199) (152.508) (202.411) (4.646) (6.013) (1.548) (5.093)
γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ 
DPRE - - -0.619** -0.299 - -5.576** - - -1.590**
(0.136) (0.142) (0.663) (0.201)
α α α α α α α α α
CONSTANT 0.194** 1.782** 0.267** - - 2.361** 0.744** 0.134** 0.655**
(0.022) (0.300) (0.012) (0.146) (0.141) (0.022) (0.054)
Number of obs 1481 1492 310 1478 582 1489 1490 1323 1494
F =            F(23,1457) = 621.77                 F(23,1468) = 429.29            F(23,1286) = 183.71                         F(23,1454) = 107.29                 F(23,558) = 75.52                   F(23,1465) = 308.20                         F(22,1467) = 364.47                   F(13,1308) = 143.58                   F(23,1470) = 148.17
Prob > F = 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
**Significant at 5 percent confidence level.
*Significant at 10 percent confidence level.
Standard Errors within parentheses  
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TABLE 7 
 
SPECIFICATION IV(DYNAMIC MODEL)
Regression with Newey-West Standard Errors
Sample: Pre-EMU: 1996:01-1998:12
                       EMU: 1999:01-2001:12
dependent variable: ASPREAD
                                AUSTRIA                                   BELGIUM                                   FINLAND                               FRANCE                                IRELAND                          ITALY                               THE NETHERLANDS               PORTUGAL                              SPAIN
X t ß 1 (X t ) ß 2 (DPRE*X t ) ß 1 (X t ) ß 2 (DPRE*X t ) ß 1 (X t ) ß 2 (DPRE*X t ) ß 1 (X t ) ß 2 (DPRE*X t ) ß 1 (X t ) ß 2 (DPRE*X t ) ß 1 (X t ) ß 2 (DPRE*X t ) ß 1 (X t ) ß 2 (DPRE*X t ) ß 1 (X t ) ß 2 (DPRE*X t ) ß 1 (X t ) ß 2 (DPRE*X t )
ASPREAD t-1 0.732** - 0.749** -0.109* 0.501** 0.170** 0.476** 0.152** 0.596** -0.158* 0.899** -0.130** 0.218** 0.279** 0.628** 0.175** 0.629** -0.175**
(0.038) (0.031) (0.059) (0.041) (0.059) (0.043) (0.055) (0.078) (0.091) (0.039) (0.050) (0.038) (0.057) (0.036) (0.044) (0.055) (0.070)
LNDEBTGDP t 0.213** 0.822** - - 0.322** 3.188* - - - - -0.240** 0.967* 0.396** -0.259** - - -0.846** 2.831**
(0.095) (0.413) (0.095) (1.780) (0.107) (0.502) (0.113) (0.108) (0.224) (0.619)
ONOFFDIF t - 0.955** - - -0.899** 2.130** - - - - - - - - - 0.305* - -
(0.412) (0.201) (0.737) (0.170)
ONOFFDIF2 t - - - - 6.024** -8.948** 11.161* -30.873** 2.746* - - - - - - -1.599* - -8.681*
(1.346) (2.481) (5.881) (11.811) (1.650) (0.856) (5.320)
BIDASKDIF t 0.214* 2.731** - -1.627** - - - - - - - - - -0.802** - - - -
(0.122) (0.669) (0.729) (0.224)
BIDASKDIF2 t -1.232** -62.528** - - - - - - - - - - - - 1.461** - 7.945** -
(0.590) (17.012) (0.699) (2.114)
USSPREAD t - -0.117** - - -0.030* 0.296* - - - - -0.201** - -0.525** 0.122** -2.310* 2.397* -0.170** 1.312**
(0.059) (0.016) (0.181) (0.101) (0.158) (0.035) (1.296) (1.302) (0.052) (0.309)
LNDEBTGDP*USSPREAD t - -1.343* - - -0.334** -6.034* - - - - 0.237** - - -0.478** 0.898** -0.665** 0.984** -4.716**
(0.773) (0.129) (3.423) (0.120) (0.123) (0.169) (0.186) (0.265) (1.055)
ONOFFDIF*USSPREAD t - -1.134* - - 1.007** -3.259** - - 0.979** - - - - - -0.702** - - -
(0.664) (0.268) (1.273) (0.433) (0.289)
ONOFFDIF2*USSPREAD t - - - - -6.907** 12.753** - 46.825** -5.651** - - - - - 2.642* - - -
(1.740) (4.281) (19.356) (2.518) (1.404)
BIDASKDIF*USSPREAD t - -5.292** - 3.577** - - - - - - - - - 0.802** - - - -
(1.242) (1.290) (0.296)
BIDASKDIF2*USSPREAD t -1.187** 130.936** - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -12.014** -
(0.593) (31.780) (3.426)
γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ 
DPRE - - -0.191** - - -0.934* - - -0.771**
(0.092) (0.501) (0.179)
α α α α α α α α α
CONSTANT 0.053** 0.382** 0.137** - - 0.241** 0.587** 0.096** 0.257**
(0.014) (0.195) (0.014) (0.102) (0.139) (0.021) (0.054)
Number of obs 1480 1491 1310 1477 582 1488 1489 1322 1493
F =            F(25,1454) = 1192.72                 F(25,1465) = 856.03            F(25,1284) = 325.44                F(25,1451) = 162.39                 F(23,556) = 104.97                    F(25,1462) = 1005.23                     F(24,1464) = 364.08                 F(15,1305) = 417.74                     F(25,1467) = 256.96
Prob > F = 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
**Significant at 5 percent confidence level.
*Significant at 10 percent confidence level.
Standard Errors within parentheses  
